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INTRODUCTION
Communist, baby killer, faggot, racist, or terrorist: Historically,
these are but a few of the odious words that have been peppered
throughout America's dialogue.' It seems that with each new political
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami School of Law, Juris Doctor
Candidate 2012. I am extremely grateful to Professor Caroline Corbin for her guidance and input
which has made this article unquestionably better. I would also like to thank Professor Copeland
for his encouragement to write this article and my family for their tireless support.
1. See generally Arthur Miller, McCarthyism, PBS.com (Aug. 23, 2006), http://www.pbs.
157
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
battle, a verbal firestorm is sure to follow. Diverse personalities engage
in rhetoric and harsh language as they become entrenched in an intense
fight to become a major influence on the nation's opinions and ideals.
Daily, Americans are inundated with messages designed to control the
tone of the nation's conversation. As divisive issues, such as immigra-
tion, racism, and other social topics, are discussed with passion and
vigor, public debate continues to grow more hateful and poignant.2 Inev-
itably, as with all battles, these heated exchanges typically yield injuri-
ous results.
Oftentimes, victims of these verbal battles suffer ruined reputations
or emotional harm. An individual may lose his or her job, suffer damage
to his or her credibility, or endure severe emotional distress. Accord-
ingly, these victims look to the courts to provide a remedy. Tort suits are
filed in attempt to recover damages for the suffering the individual has
experienced. All the while, the "culprit"-the speaker of the harsh
speech-brandishes the First Amendment as the weapon of choice to
defend him or herself from liability. What should be the result when a
person is harmed by the words of another? Should freedom of speech be
protected at all cost? Or does that approach translate into an individual
being left defenseless against the verbal attacks of others?
Throughout the last four decades, the Supreme Court has sought to
answer these questions. Struggling to balance the competing concerns of
free speech and tort liability, the Court has made several rulings in an
attempt to protect individuals from the harms of speech-based torts with-
out trampling First Amendment goals. With a series of landmark deci-
sions such as New York Times v. Sullivan', Curtis Publishing v. Butts,4
Gertz v. Robert Welch,' and others, the Supreme Court thoughtfully
org/wner/americanmasters/episodes/arthur-miller/mccarthyism/484/; Rush Limbaugh: Pelosi and
Reid 'Are Terrorists,' HuffingtonPost.com (Dec. 16, 2010, 3:40PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
comI/2010/12/16/limbaugh-pelosi-reid-terrorists-n_797675.html; Fox Host Glen Beck: Obama is a
'Racist,' HuffingtonPost.com (Aug. 28, 2009 5:12PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/
28/fox-host-glenn-beck-obama n_246310.html.
2. For instance, in an attempt to influence the 2010 congressional elections, Sarah Palin,
former Governor of Alaska and Vice Presidential Candidate, posted a map on her Facebook page
that included rifle "crosshairs." Each crosshair represented a senator that Palin wanted to "take
out" of the congressional race. Her rhetoric received national attention after Gabrielle Giffords,
one of the senators on her list, was critically injured during a shooting massacre, which occurred
at a political event. No connection, however, has been found between Sarah Palm's language and
the shooting. See John Berman, Sarah Palin's 'Crosshairs' Ad Dominates Gabrielle Giffords
Debate, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 9, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/sarah-palins-crosshairs-ad-
focus-gabrielle-giffords-debate/storyid=12576437.
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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carved out rules of law that it believed best served the goals of the First
Amendment and tort law.
In these decisions, the Court divided the First Amendment land-
scape into the "public figure" and "private figure" doctrine.' Believing
that individuals should have the right to freely criticize those who have
the power to influence public opinion, the Court restricted "public
figures"-persons who have the ability to influence public policy-from
recovering damages for speech-based torts unless they can prove that the
defendant acted with actual malice.' This standard is incredibly hard to
meet, making it exceedingly difficult for courts to recompense public
figure plaintiffs for the harm they incur from speech-based torts.
The Supreme Court, however, has declined to pronounce a rule of
law for suits brought by private figures. Instead, the Court deferred this
decision to the states-leaving each state to determine for itself the
degree of impact the First Amendment will have on tort liability., Of
course, this deference has led to divergent results among the states. 9
Free-speech advocates who are dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's
decision contend that all speech, whether spoken about a "public" or
6. The Supreme Court ruled that regulating speech concerning "public figures" would be
synonymous with the criminal punishment of seditious libel. It stated that "requiring one who
criticizes the conduct of a public figure to guarantee the truth of all his or her factual assertions
could lead to self-censorship." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279. The Court wanted society to be
free to criticize those who had the ability to influence public policy and debate. The Court,
however, held that "private figure" defendants did not have access to the media or the prominence
to influence public policy and therefore speech concerning "private figures" did not warrant the
same level of protection as speech concerning "public figures". See Id.; Curtis Publ'g, 388 U.S.
130 at 164. For more on this discussion see infra pp. 15-18.
7. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273-74; Butts, 388 U.S. at 164.
8. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). The Court ruled that in cases which
involve both a "private figure" and speech involving a public concern, the First Amendment is not
violated if individuals are held liable for the harm which results from the words that they speak, as
long as the individual is not held liable without some measure of fault. Lower courts have
interpreted this to mean that liability cannot be imposed unless at least a simple negligence
standard is imposed.
9. See Gay v. Williams, 486 F.Supp. 12, 15 (D. Alaska 1979) ("[T]he actual malice standard
[should be] applied in a libel action brought by private individuals against a newspaper for
defamatory statements regarding the individual's involvement in "an event of public or general
concern."); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Nw. Publ'ns, Inc., 321 N.E. 2d. 580 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1974) ("We adopt a standard that requires the private individual who brings a libel action
involving an event of public or general interest to prove the defamatory falsehood was published
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false."); Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, 341 N.E. 2d. 569 (N.Y. 1975) ("[W]here the content of the article is
arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern. . . to warrant. . . recovery [the plaintiff]
must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly
irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and
dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties."); Peagler v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 560
P.2d 1216 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that the negligence standard should be applied to defamatory
statements involving private figures and areas of public concern.).
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"private" figure, should be fully protected.10 Others argue that the pub-
lic figure/private figure doctrine is arbitrary and unnecessary."
Snyder v. Phelpsl2 the controversial case recently decided by the
Supreme Court, endeavored to take on this very issue. The case involves
a defendant who gains little sympathy even among supporters of his
position on free speech. Fred W. Phelps, the pastor of a fundamentalist
religious sect called Westboro Baptist Church, chose the most unbefit-
ting time to express his views. While a father was in the midst of griev-
ing the unfortunate death of his son, Phelps used contemptible and
offensive speech to express his church's fierce opposition to homosexu-
ality." "Among the church's religious beliefs is that God hates homo-
sexuality and hates and punishes America for its tolerance of
homosexuality, particularly in the United States military."l 4 To publi-
cize their beliefs, the members of Phelps' church picket at funerals of
slain soldiers and established a website-www.godhatesfags.com-
where they purport their religious views."
The Phelpses learned of Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder's death
and arrived in Westminster, Maryland, to picket his funeral.16 They car-
ried signs that conveyed hateful messages, such as "God Hates the
USA," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," and "Fag troops."" Recogniz-
ing that their message could potentially spark outrage within the com-
munity, the Phelpses called authorities prior to their arrival and made
certain to comply "with local ordinances and police directives with
respect to being a certain distance from the church.""
Albert Snyder, Matthew's father, did not see the signs until he
watched a television program while at his home but maintained that
upon seeing the broadcast he was severely distressed by the conduct of
10. See Eugene Volokh, Funerals, Fire, and Brimstone: Freedom of Speech and the
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZo L. REV. DE Novo 300 (2010).
11. For criticism of the public figure/private figure doctrine, see Derek Anderson, Is Libel
Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1991); Mark D. Walton, The Public Figure
Doctrine: A Reexamination of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. in Light of Lower Federal Court Public
Figure Formulations, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141 (1995); Patricia N. Fetzer, The Corporate
Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment "Public Figure:" Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IowA L. REV.
35 (1982); Michael K. Curtis, Monkey Trials: Science, Defamation, and the Suppression of
Dissent, 4 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 507 (1995); Harry W. Stonecipher & Don Sneed, A Survey
of the Professional Person as Libel Plaintiff: Reexamination of the Public Figure Doctrine, 46
ARK. L. REV. 303 (1993).
12. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F.Supp. 2d. 567 (D. Md. 2008), rev'd, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.
2009), cert granted, Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).
13. Id. at 571.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 572.
16. Id. at 571.
17. Id. at 572.
18. Id.
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the Phelpses.t 9 A few weeks later, Albert Snyder ran a Google search on
his son's name and found a horrific "epic poem" written by the
Phelpses. The epic described their belief that Snyder and his ex-wife
"raised their son for the devil" 20 and "taught Matthew to defy his crea-
tor." 2 1 Snyder stated that, in reaction to the protest at his son's funeral
and the "epic" that he found online, he "'threw up' and 'cried for three
hours.' "22
Outraged at the actions of the Phelpses, Albert Snyder filed a suit
against Fred W. Phelps and the Westboro Church. The jury awarded
Albert Snyder $10.9 million in damages for his claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress and intrusion of seclusion.2 3 On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit overturned the lower court's ruling.24
Almost forty years after its decision to refrain from announcing a
definitive rule in this area of law, the Supreme Court, once again, was
asked to determine whether speakers, who harshly criticize private
figures, should be given the same protection they would receive if they
would speak against a public figure. In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's ruling.25 It held that the First
Amendment barred recovery for tort liability because Westboro's speech
involved a matter of public concern. 26 The Court, however, made clear
that its ruling was narrow27 and stopped short of pronouncing a bright
line rule that would apply the public concern standard to all speech,
irrespective of a person's status.
This Article contends that the public figure/private figure distinc-
19. Id. at 573 ("Snyder testified at length about his emotional and physical reaction not only
to the demonstration at his son's funeral but also to the publication of the 'epic' on the Internet.
He specifically testified that he 'threw up' and 'cried for about three hours' after viewing the
'epic' approximately four to five weeks after his son's funeral. He also presented expert testimony
with respect to the effect that Defendants' actions had and continue to have on him.").
20. Id. at 572.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The jury awarded $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive
damages. The court eventually reduced punitive damages to $2.1 million. Accordingly, the total
damages awarded to the Mr. Snyder were $5 million. Id. at 570-571.
24. The Fourth Circuit stated that the Phelpes' speech was constitutionally protected because
the language was rhetorical and a matter of public concern which failed to contain a provably false
fact. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 220 (2009). The court defined "matters of public concern" as
speech which involves "an issue of social, political, or other interest to a community. The
interested community need not be especially large nor the relevant concern of paramount
importance or national scope." Id. Rhetorical statements are fully protected in order to "ensure
that public debate will not suffer for lack of 'imaginative expression' or the 'rhetorical hyperbole
which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our nation." Id. (quoting Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)).
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tion should be abandoned. Several of the rationales underpinning the
doctrine are no longer viable today. In addition, this Article asserts that
the Supreme Court should supplant the public figure doctrine with the
public concern standard. The public concern test will implicate the First
Amendment and apply the actual malice standard to speech concerning
all activities that relate to the function of government, such as issues of
social, educational, and political importance.2 8 Categorizing speech by a
person's status does not calibrate the appropriate balance between tort
liability and the First Amendment. It leaves some individuals vulnerable
to the harms of speech-based torts while leaving some categories of
speech unprotected. By focusing on the function of the speech rather
than the status of the speaker, the public concern standard will more
adequately protect free speech and better effectuate the purposes of the
First Amendment.
Part I will discuss the competing goals of the First Amendment and
speech-based torts. While speech-based torts are designed to protect an
individual from harm, such as injury to one's reputation, emotional well-
being, or invasion to one's privacy, the First Amendment is intended to
protect the free flow of ideas in society, the ability to access information
that will allow society to govern itself, and the ability to express oneself
freely. Part I will also examine the purposes of each and determine why
it is important to balance the interests of both concepts.
Part II will delineate a historical perspective of the public figure/
private figure distinction and analyze the evolution and purpose of the
doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence. Part III will argue that the
public concern standard is the best method of protecting free speech and
preserving First Amendment principles. It contends that the public fig-
ure/private figure distinction should be abandoned because the rationales
underpinning the standard-that private figures deserve greater protec-
tion because they enjoy less access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and that they have not thrust themselves into the limelight in
order to influence public debate-are no longer viable today.
Finally, Part IV will present three case studies: a public official
wrongfully accused by a blogger of allowing her racial bias to influence
her duties as a government agent; a published article falsely alleging that
a public figure cheats on his wife; and the Snyder case. This Article
finds that in all examples the public concern standard produces a better
and more equitable outcome than the current controlling standard.
28. Howard A. Gutman, The Attempt to Develop an Appropriate Standard of Liability for the
Defamation of Public and Private People: The Supreme Court and the Federalization of Libel
Law, 10 N.C. CENT. L. R. 201, 220 (1979).
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1. THE COMPETING GOALS OF SPEECH-BASED TORTS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
The tension between speech-based torts and the First Amendment
derives from the interests that each are meant to protect. While speech-
based torts, such as defamation, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and invasion of privacy, are meant to shield individuals from the
harm of speech, the First Amendment is designed to preserve an individ-
ual's right to speak his or her mind freely. To appreciate fully this ten-
sion, it is necessary to understand the purpose behind speech-based torts
and the First Amendment.
1. Goals of Speech-Based Torts
A. DEFAMATION
The tort of defamation has its origins in early English law.2 9 It was
established to safeguard the right of a person to protect his own reputa-
tion from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt which is essential to the
dignity and worth of every human being.3 0 To prevail in a defamation
action a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a false and
defamatory statement was made against another; (2) an unprivileged
publication of the statement was made to a third party; (3) if the defama-
tory matter is of public concern, fault amounting at least to negligence
on the part of the publisher; and (4) damage to the plaintiff.3' "The grant
of a right of action [is] also recognition that an individual has an interest
in his personal honor and that an injury to reputation may have serious
material consequences, such as pecuniary loss, impairment of social
relationships, physical injury, and mental distress."32
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Unlike defamation, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress does not have a long-standing history. Historically, courts have
been hesitant to recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED) as an independent tort.3 IIED is designed to protect an individ-
ual's interests in being free from emotional distress or disturbance. As
the America Law Reports stated:
29. See Van V. Vedeer, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV.
546 (1903).
30. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 401 (1974).
31. Aaron Larson, Defamation, Law, and Slander, http://www.expertlaw.comliibrary/
personal injury/defamation.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2010).
32. Harvard Law Review, Developments in the Law: Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 875, 877
(1956).
33. 38 A.L.R. 998 § 2 (4th ed. 1985).
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With respect to emotional distress caused by intentional conduct, the
position of most courts up until the last 40 or 50 years had been that
damages for mental anguish were recoverable only as 'parasitic' to a
physical injury or a traditional tort-if the alleged conduct resulted in
no physical injury, and did not amount to the commission of a tradi-
tionally recognized tort, there could be no recovery for any mental
injury suffered.34
The courts' reluctance to acknowledge IED stemmed from difficulties,
such as proving that an injury actually occurred or appropriately valuing
the damages that should arise from such an injury.3 5 In addition, the
courts feared that recognition of an independent tort would result in
fraudulent claims and open the floodgates of litigation.36
However, in 1948, the American Law Institute (ALI) in Section 46
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognized IED as an independent
tort regardless of the existence of a physical injury." This came after
much criticism and pressure by commentators who believed that deny-
ing recovery due to a lack of physical impact was hypocritical and triv-
ial, especially in instances where the injury was serious." The
Restatement Section 46 provided that "one who by extreme and outra-
geous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional dis-
tress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.""
Recognition of IIED by ALI led to its adoption by the courts40 and
a common framework was developed to establish guidelines for recov-
ery and to alleviate the difficulties presented by the tort. To be success-
ful in an IIED claim, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1)
that intentional or reckless conduct occurred; (2) that the conduct is
extreme and outrageous; (3) that a causal connection exists between the
wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) that the emotional
distress is severe.4 1 "Liability has been found only where the conduct is
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly








41. See Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977).
42. Id.
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C. PRIVACY
"By definition, invasion of privacy is an intrusion upon, or revela-
tion of, something private. 4 3 However, invasion of privacy is a "mislead-
ing simple label, for it really embraces several causes of action that
overlap each other and the tort of defamation."" There are four branches
of the tort: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2)
appropriation; (3) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private
life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public.45
These four branches are designed to protect several forms of pri-
vacy. The first branch of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, protects an
individual from the "intentional invasion of solitude or seclusion of
another through either physical or nonphysical means," such as "eaves-
dropping, peeping through windows, or surreptitiously opening
another's mail."4 6 The second branch, appropriation or the right of pub-
licity "lends protection to another's name or likeness." Publication of
private facts, the third branch, involves preserving the right of an indi-
vidual to be free from the publication of true facts that the common law
regards as private and, essentially, nobody's business." 48 The last branch
of privacy protects an individual from being placed in a "false light in
the public eye."49
Be it defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or pri-
vacy, each tort protects valuable interests that should be safeguarded.
Without this protection, individuals may suffer injury and never receive
recovery for the effects of the harm.o The protections gained by speech-
based torts, however, severely limit the right of the speaker and there-
fore creates tension with the First Amendment.
2. Goals of the First Amendment
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech."' However,
43. Huskey v. Nat'1 Broad. Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp. 1282, 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
44. Eleanor L. Grossman, Privacy, 3 AM. JURISPRUDENCE § 29 (2d ed. 2010).
45. Id.
46. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 3 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 24:1 (2010).
47. Id. at 24-15.
48. Id. at 24-16.27.
49. Id. at 24-5.
50. For example, a person may play a cruel joke on a pregnant woman, telling her that her
husband has died. As a result of her distress she suffers a miscarriage. Without the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the woman would be unable to seek damages for her
loss. In the same way, if a student deliberately and falsely accuses a teacher of being a child
molester and that teacher loses his or her job, without the tort of defamation, the teacher would not
be able to recover for the harm he or she suffered.
51. U.S. CONsT. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
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the original meaning of free speech or how it should be realized in
American jurisprudence has been an elusive concept. Many theories
have been posited to explain why the First Amendment exists. One's
views on the purpose of the First Amendment "tend to influence heavily
one's views on what it means and how it should be implemented."52
There are three classic free-speech theories-"marketplace of ideas,"
"human dignity and self-fulfillment," and "democratic self-
governance."
A. MARKETPLACE-OF-IDEAs THEORY
The marketplace-of-ideas theory "explains the importance of free-
dom of speech in terms of an open 'marketplace' in which ideas are
allowed to compete against one another in an ongoing process of human
enlightenment."5 4 The reasoning underlining the theory is that through
the competition of ideas, citizens will find the ultimate truth. John
Milton, one of the pioneers of the theory, wrote, "though all the winds of
doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field,
we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.
Let her and falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in
a free and open encounter."5 5
Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes, another chief proponent of the mar-
ketplace theory and also credited with ensuring it to be a "central com-
ponent in American free speech jurisprudence,"5 wrote in a passage:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes can be
carried out.57
The marketplace-of-ideas theory has become an instrumental approach
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition the
Government for redress of grievances.").
52. SMOLLA, supra note 46, at 2-3.
53. Id. According to Smolla, "all three of the classic theories have much to commend them,
and serve as important justifications for heightened protection for freedom of speech and of the
press. They should be understood, however, not as mutually exclusive defenses of freedom of
speech, but rather as mutually supportive rationales that combine to make an overwhelming case
for the elevation of free speech as a transcendent value in an open society." Id. at 2-5.
54. Id. at 2-4.
55. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING TO
THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644).
56. Id. at 2-14.
57. Abrams v. U. S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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to the First Amendment and "has won the most favor with the courts."5 8
B. HUMAN DIGNITY AND SELF-FULFILLMENT
Where the marketplace theory focuses on human enlightenment or
the quest for truth, the free speech theory of human dignity and self-
fulfillment "articulates the value of freedom of speech in terms of its
importance to the individual human being, who, without freedom of
expression, cannot be fully known."5 The ability to communicate with
others is essential to self-fulfillment and expression. It allows individu-
als to convey who they truly are while satisfying a desire to be heard.60
Justice Thurgood Marshall confirmed this theory by stating, "The First
Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the
human spirit-a spirit that demands a self-expression." 6 1 This principle
is based on the notion of the "autonomy of the individual and [his or] her
right to make choices free from coercion. "62
C. SELF-GOVERNMENT
The theory of self-government "addresses freedom of speech pri-
marily in terms of its importance to democracy. Freedom of speech is
essential in democratic governments, for it is the vehicle through which
citizens debate social policies and elect governments." 63 The crux of this
theory is that in a democratic society the polity must have access to vital
information to govern themselves properly. 64 In his treatise, Constitu-
tional Limitations, Judge Thomas Cooley endorsed this theory by
stating:
The evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely,
but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent
such free and general discussion of public matters as seems abso-
lutely essential to prepare the people for intelligent exercise of their
rights as citizens.65
D. THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO BALANCE
The First Amendment was established to grant individuals the
58. JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, THE FIRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL
7 (2d. ed. 2000).
59. SMOLLA, supra note 46 at 2-4. ("[Tihe marketplace theory justifies free speech as a means
to an end: but free speech is also an end to itself, an end intimately intertwined with human
autonomy and dignity." Id. at 2-22.
60. WOJCIECH SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS 17 (1999).
61. BARRON & DIENES, supra note 58, at 13.
62. Id.
63. SMOLLA, supra note 46, at 2-4-5.
64. Id. at 2-26.2.
65. THOMAS COOLEY, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs 886 (8th ed. 1927).
167
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
capacity to discover their own truth, achieve self-fulfillment through
freedom of expression, and participate in government through access to
all ideas, even unpopular ones, to make unrestrained decisions about
how they should be governed. As mentioned above, speech-based torts,
which are designed to limit the freedom of the speaker, are directly
opposed to the aims of the First Amendment. When the two concepts
conflict, courts must endeavor to delicately balance the values of each
and draw lines so that one will not infringe upon the other.
One type of line drawn by the court is declaring certain categories
of speech unprotected. Selected categories of speech-obscenities,
threatening words, fighting words, incitement, fraud, and child porn-
are unprotected.66 These forms of speech are considered of little value
and undeserving of First Amendment protection. Consequently, if an
individual claims they are harmed by one of these limited classes of
speech, the First Amendment will not serve as a means of protection for
the speaker.
Another line drawn is to protect speech that may be harmful to
others unless made with actual malice. 67 "Protected speech may be sub-
ject to government regulation if the state's interest is compelling and the
means of regulation narrowly tailored to accomplish a proper state pur-
pose." 68 To ensure that regulation is narrowly tailored, courts implement
substantial limits on tort liability, such as the "actual malice standard"
mentioned above. These stringent standards are imposed to make certain
that speech is not arbitrarily restricted without good cause.
Snyder is a prime example of the difficult task before the courts.
On one hand, the Phelpses were exercising their right to free speech. The
church employed the "marketplace-of-ideas" theory by spreading its
message, convictions, and religious beliefs. It also engaged the "self-
government" theory by voicing its disapproval of the government's sup-
port of homosexuality. On the other hand, Mr. Snyder was harmed emo-
tionally by the church's distasteful speech and barrage of insults. Which
interest should be valued most? Indeed, the First Amendment, being a
constitutional principle, should be given the greatest consideration. But
what is the best method of protecting individuals from harm derived
from speech?
66. Alan Stephens, First Amendment Guaranty of Freedom of Speech or Press as Defense to
Liability Stemming from Speech Allegedly Causing Bodily Injury, 94 A.L.R. FED. 26 § 3 (2009).
Speech is also abrogated in other ways such as time, place, and manner restrictions. See Perry
Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
67. The actual malice test is defined as the "intent, without justification or excuse to commit a
wrongful act, or the reckless disregard of the law or of a person's legal right." Burke v. City of
Honolulu, No. Civ. No. 08-00339 BMK, 2010 WL4811971, at *3 (D. Haw. Nov. 16, 2010).
68. Alan Stephens, supra note 66, at § 4.
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE/PRIVATE FIGURE DIsTINcTION
Before discussing the solution to this quandary, it is important to
first examine the development of the current case law. Prior to the semi-
nal case, New York Times v. Sullivan, the First Amendment had no
impact on defamation law because it was not constitutionalized.6 9 Indi-
viduals could recover damages for defamation without constitutional
limitation. Also, defamation was a strict-liability tort, which allowed
recovery for reporting false statements, even if the error was an innocent
mistake.70 In reaction to the harshness of the strict-liability rule, states
began to enact statutes to reduce or eliminate damages if an error was
made without fault." Critics of the strict-liability rule argued that the
consequences were too great a burden for the media and could result in
self-censorship.72
Amid this growing opposition to the strict-liability rule, a critical
case was making its way to the Supreme Court. The heart of the civil
rights movement was the right to communicate to the world the move-
ment's message and to broadcast the unspeakable horrors that were
occurring in the South. In New York Times v. Sullivan, this right was
threatened. A full-page newspaper advertisement titled "Heed Their Ris-
ing Voices" was distributed throughout Alabama to commend the efforts
of blacks in the South who resisted racism and to admonish Congress to
act on their behalf." The ad also solicited funds to defend false charges
brought against Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. for his support of the civil
rights movement.74
The advertisement, however, contained errors that mischaracterized
some of the events that occurred at a demonstration in Alabama, as well
as other affairs between the police and leaders of the movement.
69. See Carlo A. Pedrioli, A Key Influence in the Doctrine of Actual Malice: Justice William
Brennan's Judicial Philosophy at Work in Changing the Law of Seditious Libel, 9 COMM. L. &
PoL'Y 567, 568 (2004).
70. See Ortiz v. Vadescatilla, 102 A.D.2d 513, 516 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 159 (1979); Donald H. Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation by
Radio, 64 HARV. L. REV. 727, 756 (1951); Harvard Law Review, supra note 32; Peck v. Tribune
Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909); Williard H. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel:
The Modem Revised Translation, 49 CORN. L. Q. 581, 583-584 (1964); Margaret E. O'Neil, Libel
and Slander, 50 AM. JURISPRUDENCE § 31(2d. ed. 2010).
71. Harvard Law Review, supra note 32, at 908.
72. Id.; also see Robert A. Lefair, Radio and TV Defamation: "Fault" or Strict-liability?, 15
OHO ST. L. J. 252, 253 (1954).
73. SMOLLA, supra note 46, at 23-2.3.
74. Id.; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, app. at 305 (1964).
75. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 258 (Included in the misrepresentations were claims that the
students who demonstrated at the capital sang My Country, Tis of Thee instead of the National
Anthem and that nine students were expelled from school for leading a demonstration at the
capital when they were actually suspended for demanding service at a lunch counter in
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Although Sullivan, a public official, was not specifically mentioned in
the advertisement, he claimed that some of the statements contained in
the ad referred to him in his capacity as police commissioner. 6 He sued
the New York Times for defamation and was rewarded a half-million
dollar judgment."
The Supreme Court overturned the judgment and held that Ala-
bama's law was "constitutionally deficient" to provide the proper safe-
guards for freedom of speech." It noted that the advertisement was no
ordinary commercial ad but it "communicated information, expressed
opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought finan-
cial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are
matters of the highest public interest and concern."7 9 The Court feared
that allowing the judgment to stand would discourage publishers from
carrying this type of advertisement.o
As the Court considered its ruling, it reasoned that allowing abridg-
ment of speech regarding the conduct of a public official is analogous to
the criminal punishment of seditious libel." It pronounced that "a rule
compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions-and to do so on the pain of libel judgments virtually
unlimited in amounts-leads to a comparable self-censorship." 82 This is
so because individuals will be reluctant to speak or publish the speech of
others, even if it is the truth, because a misstatement, albeit it innocent,
could lead to liability and judgments in vast amounts. To remedy this
Montgomery. The ad also claimed that the entire student body protested the expulsion by refusing
to register when in fact most refused to register on a single day, and all students registered before
school began. Lastly, the advertisement inaccurately stated that the dining hall was padlocked,
students were barred from eating there, the police were called to the campus on several occasions,




78. Id. at 264.
79. Id. at 266.
80. Id. (Stating that the effect of such a judgment "would be to shackle the First Amendment
in its attempt to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources.")
81. Id. at 274. The Court also stated, "what a State may not constitutionally bring about by
means of criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damages
awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more
inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute." Id. Those who are prosecuted for
seditious libel have the safeguards of the criminal system, such as indictments or a burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. These safety mechanisms are not available to civil defendants. In
addition, double jeopardy is inapplicable in civil law, leaving a news organization open for several
judgments from the same publication. Id. The court was alarmed at the possibility that a
newspaper might not "survive successions of such judgments," which could ultimately stifle the
voices of those who might criticize the government. Id.
82. Id. at 279.
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concern, the Court ruled that a public official would not be allowed
recovery for defamation, unless he or she could prove that the defendant
published the defamatory statement with actual malice.83
To meet the "actual malice" standard the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant "knowingly published a false statement or acted with reck-
less disregard for the statement's truth or falsity.84 The rationale behind
this standard is that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate
and thus must be protected to give freedom of speech sufficient breath-
ing space." The First Amendment was designed to preserve "uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open"" debate, and any standard lower than
"actual malice" would be insufficient to protect its ideals. The Court's
decision dramatically changed defamation law. For the first time, the
First Amendment could be used as a defense in a defamation action.
A few years after New York Times was decided, another significant
case presented itself before the Supreme Court. In two consolidated
cases-Curtis Publishing v. Butts" and Associated Press v. Walker"-
the Court determined that the "actual malice" standard reached beyond
government officials to public figures. 9 In Butts, a newspaper published
an article accusing Wally Butts, a coach for the University of Georgia,
of "fixing" a football game. 90 The article alleged that an insurance sales-
man overheard Butts in a conversation with the head coach of the Uni-
versity of Alabama, where Butts outlined, in detail, how Georgia would
play the game.9' Butts conceded that the conversation took place but
83. Id. It is important to note that the New York Times standard does not just apply to the tort
of defamation. In Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the Supreme Court extended this
standard to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as well. Id. at 56. In Hustler, a
magazine published a parody, which stated that the famous and influential pastor, Falwell, was
involved in an incestuous relationship with his mother. Id. at 48. In turn, Jerry Falwell sued the
magazine for defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
The Court ruled that the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress were insufficient
to protect the values of the First Amendment. Id. at 53-54. It noted that the intentional prong of
the tort had no bearing because "[iun a world of debate about public affairs, many things done with
motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 53. The Court
further reasoned that previous decisions had held that "even when a speaker or writer is motivated
by hatred or ill-will his expression was protected by the First Amendment. Id. The outrageous
standard of the tort was also deficient because it ran afoul of the Court's longstanding refusal to
allow damages to be awarded where the speech in question may have an "adverse emotional
impact on the audience." Id. at 55.
84. Sullivan, 376 U.S at 280.
85. Id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 271 (majority opinion).
87. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
88. 389 U.S. 997 (1967).
89. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155.
90. Id. at 135.
91. Id. at 136.
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disputed the substance of the conversation.9 2 He sued the newspaper for
defamation after an investigation had been launched that threatened to
ruin his career.
In Walker, the Associated Press published dispatch reports of eye-
witness accounts of a massive riot as it occurred at the University of
Mississippi.93 The dispatches portrayed Walker as commanding a vio-
lent crowd to charge against federal marshals who were present to carry
out a court decree allowing an African American to attend the Univer-
sity.9 4 Walker argued that the article mischaracterized the time he spoke
to the group and whether he commanded the crowd to prevent the mar-
shals from enforcing the court order.95
In contemplating whether to extend the New York Times standard to
public figures, the Court determined that it obviously could not catego-
rize the restriction of speech as seditious liable since neither defendant
was a government official. 96 Nonetheless, the Court decided that speech
criticizing public figures still warranted First Amendment protection.
In essence, the Court used an early form of a "free speech calculus" to
balance the value of speech against the harm to the victim. The balanc-
ing test weighed the importance of the defendant's speech against "the
plaintiffs position to determine whether [the plaintiff] has a legitimate
call upon the court for protection in light of his prior activities and
means of self-defense."9 8 The Court agreed that the First Amendment
should protect speech concerning public figures because they have the
power to influence public policy and the means to defend themselves
against false statements. 99 There was disagreement, however, among the
92. Id. at 137.
93. Id. at 140. ("A massive riot erupted because of federal efforts to enforce a court decree
ordering the enrollment of a Negro, James Meredith, as a student in a University").
94. Id. Walker was a private citizen at the time of the riot. However, prior to that time,
Walker served in the United States Army and pursued a career in politics. In fact, Walker
commanded the troops "during the school segregation confrontation at Little Rock, Arkansas, in
1957." Id.
95. Id. at 141.
96. Id. at 154. ("In the cases decided today, none of the particular considerations involved in
New York Times is present. These actions cannot be analogized to prosecutions for seditious libel.
Neither plaintiff has any position in government which would permit a recovery by him to be
viewed as vindication of governmental policy. Neither was entitled to a special privilege
protecting his utterances against accountability in libel.").
97. Id. at 155.
98. Id.
99. Justice Warren gave three justifications for extending the actual malice standard to public
figures: (1) the blending of public figures into the government decision-making process gave
public figures the opportunity to shape and influence policy; (2) public figures, just like public
officials, have ready access to mass-media of communications to counteract criticism of their
views and activities; and (3) unelected public figures are not amenable to the restraints of the
political process; therefore, public opinion may be the only instrument by which society can
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Justices as to the legal standard that should be applied-the actual mal-
ice standard or one less stringent, such as simple negligence."
Although the Court was deeply divided, it ultimately extended the actual
malice standard to public figures.
In another case, the Court, once again, found itself in disagreement.
The issue before the Court was whether the New York Times standard
should be applied to cases involving private figures. Briefly, in another
plurality opinion, the Court ruled that the actual malice standard should
not be based on the status of a person but should be applied to all mat-
ters involving issues of "public interest." 10
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, a distributor of nudist magazines
sued a radio broadcaster for describing his magazines as obscene while
reporting news of his arrest.'02 In its broadcasts, the radio station failed
to use the terms allegedly or reportedly when recounting the arrest and
referred to plaintiff as a smut distributor and a girlie book peddler.' In
deciding Rosenbloom, the Court opted to focus on the content of the
speech in controversy rather than on the person involved. Justice Bren-
nan reasoned that "if a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it
attempt to influence their conduct. Warren contended that public figures have the power to
influence public policy but are not accountable to the traditional restraints of the political process.
The polity cannot vote a public figure out of office if it disagrees with the public figure's views.
Indeed, public figures are insulated from accountability and can impose their beliefs upon public
matters without restriction. Therefore, public criticism may be the only tool available to influence
the conduct of public figures. Although the Court was deeply divided in this plurality opinion, the
Court adopted Justice Warren's conclusion of extending the actual malice standard to public
figures. Id. at 163-64.
100. In a plurality opinion, Justice Harlan concluded that public figures may recover damages
for defamatory statements "on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers." Id. at 155. His opinion, however, did not carry the majority. Chief Justice Warren
commanded the majority vote which held that the actual malice standard should apply to public
figures as well as public officials. Id. at 164 (Warren, J., concurring). He wrote that the "New York
Times standard is an important safeguard for the rights of the press and public to inform and be
informed on matters of legitimate interest." Id. at 165.
101. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (In the plurality opinion, Justice
Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, concluded that the New York Times
actual malice standard should be applied to all matters of public concern. Justice Black,
concurring in the result, argued that the First Amendment is absolute. He believed that, in all
cases, plaintiffs should be barred from recovery in speech-based tort suits, whether or not the
defendant knew the statements were false when made. Id. at 57. (Black, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice White agreed that the First Amendment should be extended to matters of public
concern but wanted to confine the holding to the facts of the case. Id. at 61. (White, J., concurring
in the judgment). He elected against providing recovery to the plaintiff because the media reported
on the conduct of public servants-the actions of the police. Id. at 61-62. Justice White believed
that the holding was too broad and that the Court should not have decided an issue that was not
before them. Id.), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
102. Id. at 34. The distributor was arrested for possessing obscene material but was later
acquitted of criminal obscenity charges. Id. at 36.
103. Id. at 34.
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cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily'
choose to become involved.""
Brennan continued that "to fulfill its function, freedom of discus-
sion must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their period.""o' Throughout his opinion Brennan emphasized that it
is not the status of the individual that is of importance but rather soci-
ety's interest in discussing matters that have a profound impact on its
governance, education, ideals, and beliefs.
However, Justice Marshall did not share the same views. Marshall
believed that extending the New York Times standard to all matters of
public interest would severely reduce protection of an individual's repu-
tation.106 In his dissenting opinion, Marshall criticized the public interest
standard as "inadequate protection for both of the basic values that
[were] at stake.""o7 Marshall employed two arguments against the newly
announced standard-one of which is particularly unpersuasive.
First, Marshall argued that for the public concern standard to be
viable, the courts would have to be put into a position to decide which
matters are legitimately interesting to the public or what issues are rele-
vant to self-government. 0 He reasoned that this was precisely the dan-
ger that the First Amendment was meant to prohibit. However, as will be
discussed below, this argument has little significance in today's First
Amendment jurisprudence. Currently, courts routinely make determina-
tions of what constitutes matters of public interest.IO9 Next, Marshall
contended that the doctrine failed to protect private individuals who did
not voluntarily thrust themselves into the public limelight.1 o Justice
Harlan also dissented, stating that private individuals "have less likeli-
hood of securing access to channels of communication sufficient to rebut
falsehoods concerning him than do public officials.""'
The dissenting views of Marshall and Harlan-that private figures
required greater constitutional protection than public figures-soon pre-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 41.
106. Id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 78.
108. Id. at 79.
109. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 146 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Underhill v. Seibert, No.
291639, 2010 WL 2016310 (Mich. Ct. of App. June, 3, 2010); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning
Co. v. Nw. Publ'ns, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); DeVittorio v. Hall, 589
F.Supp. 2d 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Partington v. Bugliosi, 825 F.Supp. 906, 916 (D. Haw. 1993).
110. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 78.
111. Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 [Vol. 66:157
20111 THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND SPEECH-BASED TORTS
vailed. In Gertz, 112 the Supreme Court retreated from the public interest
standard. In an effort to provide a balance between the state's interest in
protecting its citizens from harm and the goals of the First Amendment,
the Court, although not expressly, overturned Rosenbloom and decided
against extending the New York Times standard to private individuals."i 3
Instead, the Court elected to have each state formulate its own standards
of liability as long as each state imposed some level of fault."'
Relying on the same arguments as Justice Marshall and Harlan in
Rosenbloom, Powell's decision hinged on the fact that private individu-
als (1) enjoy less access to the channels of effective communication to
rebut false statements made against them,"' and (2) have not thrust
themselves into the "forefront of public controversies in order to influ-
ence the resolution of the issues involved. "116 Concluding that private
individuals are more vulnerable than public figures, Powell ruled that
"the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a
private individual.""'
The Gertz decision fails to effectively balance the interests of the
First Amendment and speech-based torts. In many instances public
figures are left vulnerable to the harms of speech without the possibility
of a remedy. While it is important to give the highest protection for
speech concerning public figures in cases where they can use their
power to influence public policy, this level of protection is unnecessary
when the speech concerns private matters.
Also, speech involving private figures is not sufficiently protected.
The public figure/private figure distinction allows speech involving mat-
ters central to self-governance or the free flow of ideas to be unprotected
solely because a private figure is the subject. The public figure/private
figure distinction should be supplanted by the proposed standard. It cali-
brates the best balance between the First Amendment and speech-based
torts because its focus is whether the speaker was endeavoring to purport
112. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
113. Id. at 347.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 344.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 345-346. The new rule crafted by the majority barely prevailed. A one-vote
majority turned on Justice Blackmun's desire to end uncertainty in defamation law. Blackman
believed that the public concern standard was "logical and inevitable." Id. But he was concerned
about the effect of the "unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's plurality." Id. at 353. (Blackmun,
J., concurring). Blackmun stated that by removing the ability of plaintiffs to receive punitive
damages without proving actual malice significantly reduced the danger of self-censorship. Id. at
354. Thus, he concurred with the majority.
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a message that is anchored by free-speech values. In other words, the
standard will protect speech which furthers First Amendment goals.
III. RECALIBRATING THE BALANCE: THE PUBLIC FIGURE/PRIVATE
FIGURE DISTINCTION SHOULD BE ABANDONED IN FAVOR OF
THE PUBLIC CONCERN STANDARD
The arguments used as the basis for the public figure/private figure
distinction are tenuous at best and are certainly no longer pragmatic.
Indeed, protections for free speech should not be contingent on whether
a person desired to be the subject of discussion or, in other words, thrust
him or herself into public debate. In addition, a person should not be
regarded as having assumed the risk of harm merely because he or she is
in a public position. Furthermore, in today's society, modern technol-
ogy affords media access to all-not just public figures. Moreover, the
contention that it is not the job of the courts to discern what events
should be deemed as a public concern or that doing so will undermine
the First Amendment is not legitimate. Courts regularly engage the pub-
lic concern analysis in many areas of First Amendment jurisprudence.
In sum, the public figure/private figure distinction should be aban-
doned because (1) it is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive; (2) the
expectation of privacy of private figures and the assumption of risk of
public figures are not valid concepts; (3) access to the media is no longer
exclusive to public figures; and (4) courts are not unable to discern mat-
ters of public concern-in fact, they do so regularly.
1. The Public Figure/Private Figure Doctrine is Both
Under and Over-Inclusive
The public figure/private figure distinction bears little relationship
to the First Amendment. In fact, it is both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive and fails to adequately protect its objectives. The New York
Times standard sought to resolve the issue of self-censorship produced
by defamation law prior to New York Times by "protecting the market-
place-of-ideas, public discourse, and public debate.""' However, the
distinction between public figures and private figures stifles speech that
furthers these goals and protects speech that does not. In Rosenbloom,
Justice Brennan stated:
We are all 'public' men to some degree. Conversely, some aspects of
the lives of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters
of public or general concern. ... [S]uch a distinction could easily
produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues of
118. SMOLLA, supra nOte 46, at 23-61.
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public or general concern because they happen to involve private citi-
zens while extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of
aspects of the lives of public figures that are not in the area of public
or general concern."'
Private individuals are often subjects of public concern. Suppose an
individual or newspaper discusses or reports the following topics: a pri-
vate hospital which refuses care to patients without insurance, a private
school teacher changes athletes grades to allow otherwise ineligible stu-
dents to play sports, or a private company dumps toxic waste in a school
zone. Suppose the individual or newspaper was misinformed about some
of the facts or although the overall statements were true, mentions a
particular person who was not actually involved in the event.
Under the current law, the individual or newspaper could be held
liable for defamation. But why should a person or newspaper incur lia-
bility for speaking about these important topics while a newspaper that
publishes a cartoon stating that a famous pastor has engaged in an inces-
tuous relationship with his mother will not?' 20 It is inevitable that in
situations, such as the ones mentioned above, where truth is being con-
cealed, a person investigating the matter may speak erroneously. That,
however, does not diminish the fact that speech concerning those mat-
ters is of vital importance and absolutely necessary to correct the injus-
tices in society. Allowing recovery on a standard lower than actual
malice, such as simple negligence, surely leads to self-censorship, as it
has here with speech involving private figures. Individuals may restrict
their speech in fear that it could lead to liability.
In addition, the public figure/private figure distinction falls short of
protecting public figures from harm incurred by speech-based torts. It
leaves them vulnerable to verbal attacks concerning their private affairs.
Public figures stand to suffer severe irreparable injury-maybe even
more so than a private individual. Contrary to the Court's belief, public
figures can be just as defenseless to tort liability as private figures. Pub-
lic figures frequently complain about the false statements made concern-
ing their private lives.'2 1 For example, Ashton Kutcher, a famous
celebrity, threatened to sue for false statements that claimed that he was
unfaithful to his wife.12 2 However, even if the false statements caused
119. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert
Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
120. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
121. BW Team, Beware Gossip-mongers, Celebrities Will Take You to Court, BOLLYWORLD.
coM (Aug. 9, 2009), http://www.bollywoodworld.com/bollywood-news/beware-gossip-mongers-
celebrities-will-take-you-to-court- I 2096.html.
122. Rick Sault, What is Defamation and Why Didn't Ashton Kutcher Sue?, THEDISHMASTER.
coM (Dec. 18, 2010), http://thedishmaster.com/2010/12/what-is-defamation-why-didnt-ashton-
kutcher-sue.html.
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him to lose endorsements, movie roles, or even his marriage, he would
not be able to recover unless he could prove the speaker of the statement
acted with actual malice. Speech concerning the private lives of public
figures is constitutionally protected unnecessarily. A public figure
should not be vulnerable to false statements about his or her private life
without remedy. This over-inclusiveness does not advance the values of
the First Amendment and serves no other purpose.
2. Expectation of Privacy and Assumption of Risk
A second argument in support of the public figure/private figure
distinction is that private figures have a higher expectation of privacy
while public figures assume the risk of harm caused by speech-based
torts. The exponential growth of Internet access and other technology
assists in dispelling the idea that private individuals have "kept their[ ]
[lives] carefully shrouded from public view." 23 In particular, social-
media networks have caused private individuals to endure increasingly a
lower expectation of privacy. Of course, some may argue that the rise in
popularity of certain technological advances has no bearing on a per-
son's expectation of privacy. They may further suggest individuals have
not relinquished any rights to privacy merely because they access social-
media or take advantage of modern technology.
"The emergence of social media, however, combined with mass
access to technology-camera-equipped cell phones, pocket-sized video
cameras and blogospheric distribution-has enabled an insatiable mar-
ket for spying and gossip. The result has been a cultural breakdown in
decency and a blurring of the boundaries" 124 of privacy. Activities that
were deemed private in the past can no longer be characterized as such.
For example, an intimate moment between two people can now be
quickly uploaded for the world to see. 125
While some may contend that this should not be true as a normative
matter, society seems to be quickly adjusting to-and indeed embrac-
ing-the fact that the privacy it enjoyed fifty to sixty years ago no
longer exists. As an example, most users of Facebook, a social-media
phenomenon, divulge intimate details about their private lives on a daily
123. Rosenbloom, U.S. 29, at 48.
124. Kathleen Parker, Privacy Matter, Public Concern, Rutger's Suicide Illustrates Our
Culture of Disrespect, APP.com (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.app.com/article/20101003/OPINION/
10030346/1028/OPINION&source=rss.
125. Id. ("Tyler Clementi walked onto the George Washington Bridge the night of Sept. 22
[2010] and jumped over the edge. A few days earlier, authorities say, his roommate, Dharun Ravi,
and a female friend, Molly Wei, had placed a webcam in the dorm room Clementi and Ravi
shared, filmed Clementi in an intimate encounter with another man, and posted it online for all to
see.").
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basis. One glance at a user's profile can reveal the status of his or her
relationship, what the user did the night before, his or her favorite places
to visit, and a variety of other intimate details. One woman even posted
a picture of her breast after she had a mastectomy.126 These profiles are
available to hundreds and even thousands of viewers. Private individuals
have accepted the exposure modem technology has brought to their pri-
vate lives.
Similarly, "the premise that public figures have voluntarily
accepted the risk of defamation, or that it goes with the territory, is
[also] nothing more than a handy fiction." 27 Public figures rarely volun-
tarily expose their entire lives for all to see. This is evident by the count-
less lawsuits filed by celebrities and other public figures, like Ashton
Kutcher, who seek relief to no avail.
In addition, it is particularly difficult to ascertain "at what point an
individual's involvement in an issue renders him a public figure for the
purposes of that issue."12 For instance, after Oprah Winfrey made com-
ments about the sex-abuse scandal at her school in Africa, the headmis-
tress sued for defamation.129 The Court classified the headmistress as a
limited purpose public figure because "she assumed a high-level posi-
tion at a school that was envisioned as being unique and innovative with
respect to the educational system in South Africa, and which was associ-
ated with an enormously high-profile celebrity figurehead." 3 0 The court
reasoned that by taking on the position she thrust herself into public
prominence. This suggests that one can become a public figure simply
because someone who is in a prominent position employs him or her.
"In short, as one district court judge observed, 'defining public figures is
much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.' ""'' Rightly so, the pub-
lic figure/private figure distinction has been described as a "confused
126. Facebook Caves, Let's Woman Post Mastectomy Picture, FoxNEWS.COM (May 29, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,522825,00.html.
127. Joseph H. King, Deus Ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of New York Times v.
Sullivan: Applying the Times For All Seasons, 95 Ky. L. J. 649, 698 (2007); see also Aafco
Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Nw. Publ'ns, Inc., 321 NE.2d 580, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)
("The argument that public officials and public figures assume the risk of defamation by
voluntarily placing themselves in the public eye is a misconception of the role which every citizen
is expected to play in a system of participatory self-government. Every citizen, as a necessary part
of living in society, must assume the risk of media comment when he becomes involved, whether
voluntarily or involuntarily, in a matter of general or public interest. It has long been recognized
that '[e]xposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized
community.'") (quoting Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
128. Gutman, supra note 28, at 220.
129. Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693 F.Supp. 2d 442, 465 (E.D. Pa., 2010).
130. Id. at 502.
131. Gutman, supra note 28, at 220 (quoting Rosonova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F.Supp.
440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976)).
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meandering state of affairs."' 32
3. Access to the Media is Not Exclusive to Public Figures
The notion that private figures deserve a higher degree of protec-
tion from tort liability than public figures because they have less access
to means of rebutting false claims is also a fallacy. Due to modem tech-
nology, public figures do not enjoy exclusive access to the media. The
Indiana Court of Appeals made this point in 1974:
Only rarely will a public official or public figure have attained suffi-
cient prominence to commend media attention which will provide a
meaningful chance to rebut and defend against defamatory falsehood.
Even in the rare case where an adequate opportunity for reply is
afforded, it is unlikely that the rebuttal statements will receive the
same degree of public attention as the defamation.133
In addition, the Internet has provided private individuals with
instant access to mass-media communications in order to counteract crit-
icisms of their views and activities, especially with the use of blogs,
social-media networks, and other phenomena. 134 However, critics may
argue that these mechanisms do not place private individuals on equal
footing with public figures that have major networks at their disposal,
such as CNN, NBC, or major newspapers, such as the New York Times.
This argument, however, greatly underestimates the influence that
the Internet and social-media provide private individuals in our society
today. For instance, one man used Twitter, a very popular social-media
network, to post criticism about a change that a major sports network,
ESPN, made to its social-media policy.135 The Twitter posting attracted
world-wide attention as many also posted their dissatisfaction with the
change. Within a few hours, ESPN was forced to address the issue and
132. Id.
133. Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Nw. Publ'ns, Inc., 321 NE.2d 580, 588 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1974).
134. Raymond Tray, Impact of Social Media on Society, EZINE ARTICLES (Feb. 4, 2011), http://
ezinearticles.com/?Impact-of-Social-Media-on-Society&id=5378885 ("Social-media or "social
networking" has almost become part of our daily lives and being tossed around over the past few
years. It is like any other media such as newspaper, radio and television but it is far more than just
about sharing information and ideas. Social networking tools like Twitter, Facebook, Flickr and
Blogs have facilitated creation and exchange of ideas so quickly and widely than the conventional
media. The power to define and control a brand is shifting from corporations and institutions to
individuals and communities. It is no longer on the 5Cs (e.g. condominium, credit cards and car)
that Singaporeans once talked about. Today, it is about the brand new Cs: creativity,
communication, connection, creation (of new ideas and products), community (of shared
interests), collaboration and (changing the game of) competition.").
135. Jennifer VanGrove, ESPN Responds to Criticism and Publishes Social Media Policy,
MASHABLE.COM (Aug. 4, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/08/04/espn-social-media/.
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clarify its position on social-media.13 6 In another example, thousands of
Twitter users voiced their displeasure with the amount of news coverage
CNN gave to the Iranian elections.' Shortly thereafter, CNN increased
its coverage of the elections and listed it as one of its top stories. The
Internet has afforded many with a platform to voice their concerns to a
wide audience. Private individuals employ this mechanism to influence
policy decisions and enter into public debate.
4. Institutional Incompetence
Finally, the assertion that courts are unable to determine matters of
public concern or that doing so undermines the First Amendment is also
a false assumption. In First Amendment jurisprudence, there are several
areas where courts are required to determine which issues are matters of
public concern.'13  Courts can effortlessly import this analysis to all
cases involving speech-based torts.
In fact, a version of the public concern test used by the courts traces
its origin to the Gertz opinion. Gertz has been interpreted as stating that
a person can be a "limited purpose public figure if he or she voluntarily
injects him or herself, or is drawn, into a public controversy."'13 Private
individuals can find themselves temporarily converted into a public fig-
ure for an unlimited range of issues. The threshold question to determine
this is whether the defamatory statement involves a public concern. As
mentioned above, the limited purpose public figure test, which has been
incorporated into the public/private figure doctrine, can be quite a "con-
fused and meandering state of affairs." 4 0 Nonetheless, the very Court
that declined the public concern standard has authorized its use when
determining when an individual becomes a 'limited purpose public
figure.'
Underhill v. Seibertl4 ' is a clear example of this. Several penalties
were assessed against Burt Township officials for not forwarding
employee-withholding taxes to the IRS for several years.142 Underhill,
an attorney, believed that Siebert, a former treasurer for Burt Township,
136. Id.
137. Pete Cashmore, #CNNFail: Twitter Blasts CNN Over Iran Election, MASHABLE.COM
(June 14, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/06/14/cnnfail/.
138. Aafco, 321 NE.2d at 588. ("The contention that the judiciary will prove inadequate for
such a role would be more persuasive were it not for the sizeable body of federal and state cases
that have employed the concept of a matter of general or public interest to reach decisions in libel
cases involving private citizens.").
139. Partington v. Bugliosi, 825 F.Supp. 906, 916 (1993).
140. Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693 F.Supp. 2d 442, 498 (E.D. Pa., 2010).
141. No. 291639, 2010 WL 2016310 (Mich. Ct. App. June 3, 2010).
142. Id. at *1.
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was responsible for the matter.' 43 Underhill called for an investigation,
which revealed no evidence of wrongful activity by Siebert.'" In
response, Siebert sent an email to a newspaper reporter which accused
Underhill of conducting a witch hunt, purposefully delaying the results
of the investigation, and "feeding the people distorted information and
lies to justify [his] existence so he can continue to be in charge."l 45
Underhill sued for defamation of character. The court found that since
he "voluntarily agreed to investigate allegations of public wrongdoing
involving Burt Township, and the defamatory statements related to
Underhill's handling of this matter, which was a highly public concern
within the township," 46 he was a limited purpose public figure.147
The Supreme Court also used the public concern standard in deter-
mining which party should bear the burden of proof in defamation cases.
In Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,14 8 a newspaper published articles
stating that Hepps, a principal stockholder of a corporation, and others
"had links to organized crime and used those links to influence the
State's governmental processes."' 49 However, there was no conclusive
evidence that the statement was either true or false. Pennsylvania law
followed a presumption of falsity, which placed the burden on the news-
paper to prove that the statement was true.150
To determine whether the common law's presumption of falsity-
which placed the burden of proof on the defendant-adequately pro-
tected First Amendment goals, the Court relied upon the public concern
test. It stated that "one can discern [from the New York Times line of
cases"'] that two forces reshape the common-law landscape to conform
to the First Amendment.152 One force is whether the plaintiff is a public




146. Id. at *5.
147. Id. ([A] person who project[s] himself into the arena of public policy, public controversy
and pressing public concern is a public figure.).
148. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
149. Id. at 775.
150. Id.
15 1. The Court reviewed the New York Times line of cases and found that the governing rule is
that where the speech involves a public concern and a public official/figure, it deserves the highest
protection. Where speech involves a public concern and a private figure, it deserves some
constitutional protection; however, the level should be determined by the states. But where the
speech involves a private matter and a private figure, "the constitutional requirements do not
necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of the common-law landscape." Id.
This rule is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in that public officials/figures receive no
protection in matters that concern their private lives while not giving sufficient protection to some
matters of public concern. See supra pp. 320-322.
152. Phila Newspapers, 475 U.S. 767 at 775.
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of public concern."' The Court reasoned that where the speech
involves a public concern and a private figure, "the Constitution still
supplants the standards of common law."l 54 It went on to rule that where
a matter is of public concern, the constitutional rule should, again, super-
sede the common law standard thereby requiring the plaintiff to "bear
the burden of showing falsity.""
The test announced in Pickering -v. Board of Education 56 and Con-
nick v. Myers15 1 provides yet another example that confirms that the
public concern standard is not a foreign concept to the Supreme Court.
In adjudicating claims involving the constitutional protection of public
employees' speech, the threshold question for the Supreme Court is,
once again, whether the speech concerns a matter of public concern. The
Court held that it must seek "a balance between the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through employees."'" 8 The Court fur-
ther stated that public employers should "enjoy wide latitude in manag-
ing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name
of the First Amendment" if the employee's speech does pertain to a
matter of public concern.' 5 9
For example, in Devittorio v. Hall, 0 police officers alleged that
they were retaliated against by the police department for expressing con-
cerns about a camera that was placed in the locker room to reveal
alleged departmental corruption.16' The police officers claimed that the
retaliation was in violation of their First Amendment rights because their
speech involved a public concern. The court's key inquiry was whether
the speech was a matter of private concern-made in the police officers'




156. 391 U.S. 568 (1968).
157. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
158. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. In Pickering, a high school teacher was dismissed from his
position "for sending a letter to a local newspaper in connection with a recently proposed tax
increase that was critical of the way in which the Board and the district superintendent of schools
had handled past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools." Id. at 564.
159. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (In Connick, an employee was fired for distributing a
questionnaire that "solicit[ed] the views of her fellow staff members concerning office transfer
policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors,
and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns." The Supreme Court
declined to protect the speech, stating "the Amendment's safeguarding of a public employee's
right, as a citizen, to participate in discussions concerning public affairs [should not be] confused
with the attempt to constitutionalize the employee grievance.").
160. 589 F.Supp. 2d 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
161. Id. at 250.
183
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
public citizens. The court determined that the police officers were
expressing a personal grievance and refused to characterize their state-
ments as protected by the First Amendment.
As exhibited, courts commonly employ the public concern standard
in First Amendment jurisprudence. Doing so, as the Supreme Court sug-
gested, has not undermined the First Amendment. On the contrary, the
public concern standard has prevented liability in circumstances where
individuals have a right to voice their concerns, such as in Underhill and
Hepps. It has also denied recovery where the true content of the speech
was couched in a matter that appeared it was of public concern but was
not, such as in Devittorio. The instances in which the public concern
standard was used provided effective protection of First Amendment
goals.
5. The Real Issue: A Lack of a Clearly Defined Standard
The problem with the standard pronounced by the plurality in Rosen-
bloom is not whether the courts will be put into a position to determine
what is relevant to the public interest of self-government, but rather
whether the Court is willing to clearly define what constitutes a matter
of public concern. Howard Gutman, a proponent of the public concern
test, nevertheless criticized the Rosenbloom standard as authorizing too
much protection. 62 The public interest standard included a vast range of
issues, many of which had no connection to the purpose of the First
Amendment. Gutman noted that:
A public concern is differentiated from mere public interest. A public
interest test may protect issues of which the public has a curiosity
about or a lurid thirst for details, the public concern test protects only
those issues of governing importance. So, while a socialites divorce
may be a matter of public interest, it is not a matter of public
concern.16 3
Essentially, the Rosenbloom standard was too broad and the lack of
a clearly defined standard was its primary defect. The proper standard
should protect robust uninhibited debate as well as preserve speech as
the marketplace of ideas. It will not depend upon the status of an indi-
162. Gutman, supra note 28, at 215. ("The difficulty with the new standard is that lower courts
have held few topics to be beyond the octopus-like scope of the term 'public interest'. Public
interest has been found in subjects ranging from errant golf shots to the behavior of a political
candidate's children. One author thought that under the Rosenbloom standard, 'the very fact that a
news medium reports an event might be said to create a virtually conclusive presumption that the
event is of public concern.' Little remains of the interest in good name if the discussion of almost
all issues is given the protection of the actual malice standard. The Rosenbloom standard protects
unimportant information with the cost of giving the citizen little recourse for injury to his
reputation.").
163. Id. at 224.
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vidual but will protect all persons-whether public or private-when
speech pertains to issues not involving matters of public concern. Gut-
man contended that the public concern standard should be defined as
applying "to the discussion of all activities relating to the function of
self-government."' 64 This article, however, argues that the standard
should apply to speech made in the furtherance of education or knowl-
edge as well. 165 It should "include[ ] those issues of social, [educa-
tional], and political importance for which the public must receive
information if it is to sagaciously conduct its decision-making"1 66 or
enhance its learning.
While the public figure doctrine focuses on the status of the person
toward which the speech is directed, the public concern test focuses on
the content and function of the speech. Constitutional protection should
be granted to any speech which seeks to further the goals of the First
Amendment, especially to provide a marketplace for ideas and to pro-
mote self-government. As concluded by the DeVittoriol6 7 court, in
determining whether speech addresses a matter of public concern the
court should take "into account the content, form, and context of a given
statement as revealed by the whole record."1 68
Although the DeVittorio court applied this analysis to speech
involving public employees, it should be exercised in the area of speech-
based torts. Speech should not be piecemealed, but rather the Court
should examine the overall content and context of the speech. If the
court determines that the speech is a matter of public concern, the plain-
tiff should not recover unless he or she can prove that the defendant
acted with actual malice.
164. Id. at 223.
165. While Gutman's definition is certainly on the right track, it is incomplete. Gutman's
definition focuses on the theory of self-government while failing to include the theory of the
marketplace of ideas. The First Amendment should not only protect individuals who criticize
political matters, such as official conduct of public officials or social issues such as abortion or
homosexuality, but it should also protect those who criticize matters of educational importance,
such as scientific or medical theories.
166. Id. Gutman states that "some matters of political importance are discussion of pending
legislation, commentary on the functioning of governmental bodies, commentary on institutions,
companies, and individuals in their relation to government, plans for reform of government, and
speech relating to official conduct of public officials. . ..Matters of social importance are those
matters which though not explicitly political, may have a significant effect upon people's lives."
Id. at 223-224 n.149. Matters of educational importance include any ideas, new concepts, or
hypotheses that will enhance the education of society.
167. 589 F.Supp. 2d 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
168. Id. at 259.
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IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE PUBLIC
CONCERN STANDARD
The three case studies below will apply the public concern stan-
dard. One case-the Shirley Sherrod example-will have the same out-
come under the public concern standard as it would under the existing
law. The other two case studies-the philanthropist and Snyder v.
Phelps-yield a different result. The emphasis will be on the last two
examples and how the public concern standard produces the more equi-
table result.
1. Government Official Falsely Accused of Racism
Shirley Sherrod, a government official at the Department of Agri-
culture, found herself in the midst of a political controversy. A conserva-
tive blogger, Andrew Breitbart, posted online a misleading and "heavily
edited" video clip of Sherrod, which portrayed her as a racist and sug-
gested that racism affected her job duties.16 9 The edited video depicted
Sherrod at an NAACP luncheon "talking about how she did not use the
full force of her office to help a white farmer.""o However, a copy of
the full video revealed quite the opposite. Shirley Sherrod was explain-
ing her own struggles with race and how she "realized that the greatest
inequality in America today is class.""' She went on to discuss how she
helped the farmer.
Breitbart admitted to strategically posting the video to combat a
campaign to "falsely malign opponents of the Democratic Party as
racist."1 72 His intention was to highlight reverse racism within the Dem-
ocratic Party.17 3 Eventually, Sherrod was forced to resign after a media
firestorm ensued.41 7  Later, the public was astonished when it was
revealed that Sherrod did not allow racial bias to affect her responsibili-
ties after all and that Breitbart had edited the video in an attempt to
inaccurately characterize the NAACP and the Democratic Party as
racist. 175
Putting the First Amendment aside, Shirley Sherrod would indeed
169. Brian Stelter, When Race Is the Issue, Misleading Coverage Sets Off an Uproar, N.Y.
TIMES (July 26, 2010), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DEEDF1638F935Al5
754COA9669D8B63&ref=shirleysherrod.
170. Patrick Johnson, Shirley Sherrod, Does She Have a Case Against Andrew Breitbart?, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 29, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/
0729/Shirley-Sherrod-Does-she-have-a-case-against-Andrew-Breitbart.
171. Id.
172. Stelter, supra note 169.
173. Id
174. Id.
175. Johnson, supra note 170.
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have a valid tort claim.' 76 She was falsely branded as a racist, as the
entire world watched, and lost her job as a result. The current doctrine,
however, would make it difficult for Sherrod to win a tort claim. The
court would first look at Sherrod's status. Because of her position as a
public official, the New York Times standard would unquestionably
apply and, to recover, Sherrod would have to prove that Breitbart acted
with actual malice when he misrepresented her as a racist.
In contrast to focusing on Sherrod's status, the public concern stan-
dard would look at the function of the speech. According to Breitbart,
his intention was to criticize and charge the Democratic Party as a racist
institution. In an attempt to influence the outcome of the upcoming elec-
tion, he planned to expose the Democratic Party as race baiters.I" Under
the public concern test, the First Amendment would also play a signifi-
cant role. In criticizing Sherrod's ability to fairly allocate government
funds, Breitbart's speech concerned an issue of public importance. Cer-
tainly, it is critical for the polity to be informed that a government offi-
cial engaged in racism. Although some may have disagreed with his
approach, the First Amendment guarantees Breitbart the right to ques-
tion the conduct of a government official. Just as with the public figure
doctrine, the public concern standard would require Sherrod to prove
that Breitbart acted with actual malice in order to recover damages.
Although the State has a great interest in protecting Shirley Sher-
rod's reputation from harm, allowing critics to incur liability solely by
voicing their concerns about her activities while operating within the
scope of her position would lead to grave consequences. As the Supreme
Court has stated on numerous occasions, "a rule compelling the critic of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and
to do so on the pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amounts-
leads to a comparable self-censorship.""' Nonetheless, since Breitbart
intentionally edited the video to give a false impression of Shirley Sher-
rod, it is quite possible that she will be able to prove actual malice and
win her claim.
2. The Private Life of a Public Figure
The next case study involves a fictional example. It illustrates the
difference in outcomes between the two standards when a defamatory
176. To satisfy the elements of the tort of defamation, the plaintiff must prove that (1) a false
and defamatory statement was made, (2) an unprivileged publication of the statement was made to
a third party, and (3) plaintiff incurred damages. Here all elements were met in that Breitbart
falsely maligned Shirley as racist, he posted the video online for millions to see, and Sherrod lost
her job as a result.
177. Id.
178. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 274 (1964).
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statement concerns the private life of a public figure. Assume that a
newspaper article is published about a well-known businessperson and
philanthropist that falsely claimed that he repeatedly cheats on his wife.
Although the author was negligent in failing to adequately verify his
sources, he did not write his article with malicious intent.
Under the current doctrine, once again, the court would be required
to look at the status of the philanthropist as a public figure. He would
achieve this status because he is in the public limelight and has the
power to influence and shape public policy. Due to this status, the phi-
lanthropist would be barred from recovery unless he proved that the
author acted with actual malice. This would be so, not because his
behavior-cheating on his wife-may adversely impact public policy or
affect his duties in anyway, but solely because he is in a position to
influence public affairs. His status as a public figure leaves him open to
virtually all kinds of personal attacks without regard for his right to pro-
tect his reputation, privacy, and emotional well-being. The public con-
cern standard, however, would have a different result.
Under the public concern standard, the court's primary concern
would be to analyze the function of the author's speech. Taking into
consideration the speech as a whole, the court would analyze whether
the author was trying to serve a broad public purpose in making his
statements. It would question whether the article highlighted the philan-
thropist's conduct to speak out against adultery or whether the author
called into question his ability to work on public issues because of his
behavior.
Here, however, the author was not critiquing the philanthropist's
business or social policies. Rather, he merely reported an interesting
story concerning the businessman's private affairs. The issue of whether
the philanthropist cheats on his wife or treats her inappropriately is a
private matter between husband and wife, not a matter of public con-
cern. As a result, the First Amendment would not be implicated or
require the actual malice standard to be met before allowing recovery.
Critics may argue that since the philanthropist is a public figure and
has the capacity to influence public policy his character should be
regarded as a matter of public concern. While it is true that today's soci-
ety has an insatiable appetite for the details of the private lives of public
figures, it does not have the right to know or discuss the particulars of an
individual's marriage. The philanthropist's position as a public figure
stems from the contribution of his intellectual capital and business acu-
men to society.
The public has a right to discuss any issue arising from or affecting
his role in making policy decisions, such as fraudulent business prac-
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tices, lying about the quality of his education, or taking bribes to advo-
cate for policies that he does not truly support. How he behaves in his
private life, however, has no bearing on his ability to make quality busi-
ness or policy decisions. Speech involving his behavior would not impli-
cate the First Amendment.' 79 Not any of the First Amendment goals
would be advanced by requiring the actual malice standard in this case.
Knowledge of a public figure's affair is not the kind of vital information
needed for society to govern itself properly. 80 It does not enhance the
process of human enlightenment, nor does it assist in the process of self-
fulfillment.
3. Snyder v. Phelps: A Public Concern and a Private Figure
Snyder is in complete contrast to the philanthropist case. Although
at first glance it appears that the Phelps' speech focused on private
affairs, when examined closely it becomes apparent that it concerned a
public matter. But first reviewing the case under the public figure doc-
trine, the key inquiry would be whether Snyder is a public figure. Taking
into account that Snyder-whose role in this drama is merely as a father
mourning the death of his son-is not in the position to influence public
policy and did not thrust himself into the public eye, he would indeed be
considered a private figure. Consequently, Snyder would be allowed to
recover damages if he is able to meet the fault standard established by
his state-in this case, the court did not require fault.' 8 '
In contrast, under the public concern standard, Snyder would not be
able to recover without proof of actual malice because the Phelpses were
speaking on a matter of public concern. In picketing the funeral and
179. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245 (1961)
(The First Amendment does not protect a freedom to speak. It protects the freedom of those
activities of thought and communication by which we govern. It is concerned, not with a private
right but with a public power, a governmental responsibility.. . These responsibilities mentioned
are three kinds. We, those who govern, must try to understand the issues which, incident by
incident, face the nation. We must pass judgment upon the decisions which our agents make upon
those issues. And, further, we must share in devising methods by which those decisions can be
made wise and effective or, if need be, supplanted by others which promise greater wisdom and
effectiveness.).
Meiklejohn went on to further explain that the First Amendment forbids the abridgement of
speech whenever it is "utilized to govern the nation." Id. at 255-256. In other words, the First
Amendment is not concerned with speech that has no bearing on how the nation governs itself.
How the philanthropist behaves in his private life should not implicate the First Amendment if it
has no effect on governance.
180. SMOLLA, supra note 43, at 2-26.2.
181. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F.Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008) (The court merely instructed the jury
on the First Amendment and advised it to balance the defendant's First Amendment rights against
Maryland's interest in protecting its citizens from emotional distress. Id. at 581. The court stated
that because the speech was of private concern, it deserved considerably less protection than
speech that is of public concern. Id. at 576-77.).
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writing the epic, the church's purpose was to criticize the government's
support of homosexuality. Matters concerning homosexuality are hotly
contested throughout the nation. Pastors and parishioners often express
their views on homosexuality in an attempt to influence public opin-
ion.82 Allowing recovery without actual malice would chill this speech.
Individuals would refrain from voicing their views due to a fear of being
sued for causing emotional distress to another. Although the language
used by the Phelpses was particularly loathsome, the Supreme Court
makes clear that speech may not be abridged just because it is
offensive. 183
One argument against denying recovery to Snyder is that although
the protestors carried signs with general messages consistent with their
views on homosexuality, they also carried signs more personal in nature
such as "God hates you" and "you're going to hell" which were targeted
specifically toward the Snyder family. The contention is that these signs
should certainly expose the Phelpses to liability because it was a per-
sonal attack and not a critique of public policy.184 Again, while these
signs are distasteful, considering the content, form, and context of the
whole record, the signs purported messages of public concern.
As noted by the Supreme Court, "the content of Westboro's signs
plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than
182. See Pastor John Hagee, Homosexuality and Collective Punishment, THE ARGENT WALL
(March 3, 2008), http://argentwall.blogspot.com/2008/03/pastor-john-hagee-homosexuality-and.
html; Pastor and Gospel Artist, Donnie McClurkin Speaks Out Against Homosexuality; He Admits
He Has Homosexual Thoughts, BCNNl.com (November 20, 2009, 9:30AM), http://black
christiannews.com/news/2009/1 l/pastor-and-gospel-artist-donnie-mcclurkin-speaks-out-against-
homosexuality-he-admits-he-has-homosexu.html; Daniel Connolly, Memphis Pastors, County
Commissioner Speak Against Anti-Discrimination Measure, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (May 26,
2009), http://m.commercialappeal.com/news/2009/may/26/memphis-pastors-county-
commissioner-speak-against-/.
183. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-746 (1978) ("[T]he fact that society may
find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection.
For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the
marketplace-of-ideas."); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("[Ilt is firmly settled that
... the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited mainly because the ideas are themselves
offensive to some of their hearers.").
184. Some might even contend that the speech amounts to fighting words. However, it does
not meet the standard. Fighting words are those which "provoke immediate violence." Chaplinsky
v. N.H., 315 U.S. 368, 372 (1942). Accusing someone of being a homosexual or claiming that
someone is going to hell is not the type of speech that courts consider would provoke someone to
immediate violence. Many may simply deny the charge or explain his or her position. In the same
way, it does not constitute the unprotected category of incitement. To fall within this category, the
Phelpses would have to intend for their speech to produce, and it must also be likely to produce,
imminent lawless action. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Here, there is no
evidence to support that the Phelpses intended to cause those who heard their message to break the
law. Therefore, their speech does not rise to a level of incitement.
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matters of purely private concern."'15 The signs that purported "You are
going to Hell" are not a personal attack against the Snyders, but a part of
the overall discussion that God is displeased with the military's support
of homosexuality. The signs support Westboro's view that God will
punish those who do not subscribe to their ideology. Even if the signs
contained some personalized content, in the Phelps' mind, the function
or purpose behind the speech was to prick the moral consciousness of
America to cause it to turn away from its support of homosexual con-
duct. In fact, the Court stated, "even if a few signs. . .were viewed as
containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifi-
cally, that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant
theme of Westboro's demonstration spoke to broader public issues."186
In the same way, the First Amendment should also protect the epic
written by the Phelpses. Just like the signs, the epic was a medium used
to voice the Phelps' opposition of homosexuality. Again, critics may
argue that the epic addressed matters of private concern and the actual
malice standard should not be applied. While it may be true that a seg-
ment of the epic addressed how the Snyders raised their son-namely it
suggested that the Snyders "taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to
divorce, and commit adultery" 1 7-the epic, as a whole, was a matter of
public concern because its content explained the Phelpses' grounds in
conducting the funeral protest.
The Supreme Court declined to consider the epic in deciding the
Snyder case, 8 however, the Fourth Circuit explained, "The Epic cannot
be divorced from the general context of the funeral protest."" The epic
contained "nearly two pages of Bible verses," 90 which links the
speaker's purpose for the epic back to the original message that God
disapproves of America's political and moral conduct. The epic
185. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011). In the Fourth Circuit's analysis of
whether the signs concerned an issue of public or private concern, the court used as an example
"the public firestorm that erupted in 2001 after two prominent religious figures, Jerry Falwell and
Pat Robertson, alleged that the September 11 terrorist attacks represented God's punishment for
our country's attitudes regarding homosexuality and abortion." Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206,
223 (2009). The pastors made these comments within days of the attacks. Just as in Snyder, some
may have certainly found the speech outrageous and contemptible, especially after the needless
death of thousands of Americans. However, does this mean that the pastors should not be allowed
to voice their opinion?
186. Snyder, 131 S.Ct. at 1216.
187. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 225.
188. Snyder, 131 S.Ct. at 1214, n. I ("The epic is not properly before us and does not factor in
our analysis. Although, the epic was submitted to the jury and discussed in the courts below,
Snyder never mentioned it in his petition for certiorari. .. Given the foregoing and the fact that an
Internet posting may raise distinct issues in this context, we decline to consider the epic in this
case.").
189. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 225.
190. Id. at 224.
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expressly reveals the author's belief that Matthew Snyder's death was
God's plan to provide the Westboro Church an opportunity to preach
God's message to the U.S. Naval Academy, the Maryland Legislature,
and the "whorehouse called the St. John Catholic Church."' 9 1 The func-
tion of the Phelps' speech was to publicize their message.'9 2
Certainly, the Phelpses have a right to petition the government with
its grievance that it should not support or embrace homosexual conduct.
They also have a right to criticize the Catholic Church and to persuade
society to accept their religious views. This is precisely the type of
speech the First Amendment was designed to protect. Indeed, the First
Amendment is not needed to protect speech that is agreeable to all.
Although the means used to spread their message caused harm to the
Snyders, the public concern standard would require that the Phelpses
committed the harm knowingly, purposefully, or recklessly.
The personal nature of the signs and the epic may exhibit some ill-
will. However, in Hustler v. Falwell,19 3 the Supreme Court noted that
"in the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with
motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amend-
ment... Even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill-will,
his expression was protected by the First Amendment." 194 The question
is not whether the personal nature of the speech should remove constitu-
tional protection but rather whether the circumstances involving the
event rose to a level of actual malice.
Here, the key word is malicious. The fact that the Phelpses' con-
duct may have been outrageous to many is insufficient to remove consti-
tutional protection from their speech. The Supreme Court has stated that
"[o]utrageousness in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression."195 The Court went on to
note that allowing removal of protection would run "afoul of [its] long-
standing refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in
question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience." 196
"Outrageous" is not synonymous with "actual malice." The two
terms can be differentiated in that actual malice concentrates on the pur-
pose or intent of the speaker where outrageousness takes into account
the manner of the speech or the circumstances surrounding how the
191. Id.
192. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F.Supp. 2d. 567 (2008).
193. Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
194. Id. at 53.
195. Id. at 47.
196. Id. at 55.
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speech was conveyed. Outrageousness encompasses "conduct [that] is
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community."197 With regard to speech-based
torts, actual malice is defined as a conscious disregard for the legal
rights of others. 198
To demonstrate the actual malice standard, facts that give rise to
such a level include the following scenarios: a teacher, upset that his
colleague received a promotion over him, falsely tells others that he sus-
pects his colleague of molesting children; an employee, angered that he
was fired, submits a false complaint that his former boss, a public offi-
cial, is embezzling funds; or an individual, upset at the rise in prostitu-
tion and other crime in his neighborhood, sends the mother of a
murdered prostitute several emails-even after she repeatedly asked to
be left alone-stating that her daughter deserved to die because it made
the neighborhood safer. All of these examples involve matters of public
concern and may also constitute the torts of defamation or intentional
infliction of emotional distress with actual malice. Indeed, each speaker
either defamed or intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct which
could cause severe distress. Yet, his or her speech also rose to a level of
actual malice because each speaker consciously or purposefully disre-
garded his or her victim's right to be free from reputational or emotional
harm.
Opponents may contend that, just as in the examples above, the
Phelpses also consciously disregarded the Snyders' right to be free from
emotional disturbance. They may point to the choice of picketing at a
funeral, the personal nature of the signs, and the callousness of the mes-
sage delivered during a time of bereavement as facts that support a find-
ing of actual malice.'99 This is arguably a close case. However, the fact
197. G'Sell v. Carven, 724 F.Supp. 2d 101, 109 (D. D.C. 2010).
198. In Hustler, the Supreme Court did not define the actual malice standard in the context of
the IIED tort. However, at least one court has explained that outside defamation, the actual malice
test is defined as the "intent, without justification or excuse to commit a wrongful act, or the
reckless disregard of the law or of a person's legal right." Burke v. City of Honolulu, No. Civ. No.
08-00339 BMK, 2010 WL4811971, at *3 (D. Haw. Nov. 16, 2010).
199. In his dissent in Snyder, Justice Alito stated, "the Supreme Court suggests that
respondents' personal attack on Matthew Snyder is entitled to First Amendment protection
because it was not motivated by a private grudge, but I see no basis for the strange distinction that
the Court appears to draw. Respondent's motivation-to increase publicity for its views-did not
transform their statements attacking the character of a private figure into statements that made a
contribution to debate on matters of public concern. Nor did their publicity-seeking motivation
soften the sting of their attack. And as far as culpability is concerned, one might well think that
wounding statements uttered in the heat of a private feud, are less, not more, blameworthy than
similar statements made as part of a cold and calculated strategy to slash a stranger as a means of
attracting public attention. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1227 (2011).
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that Westboro Church engaged in a peaceful protest, Snyder was not
even aware of the protest until hours after the funeral had ended, and the
church made sure to obey all time, place, and manner restrictions
imposed by the state, played a critical role in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion to affirm the lower court's ruling to set aside the jury's verdict.20
In fact, the Court noted, "the record confirms that any distress occa-
sioned by Westboro's picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of
the message conveyed rather than any interference with the funeral
itself."20 ' The public concern standard ensured the Phelps' right to voice
their opposition to homosexuality while protecting Snyder from mali-
cious attacks.
The obvious question becomes: Can a person intentionally inflict
distress or defame another so long as he or she surrounds the attack with
language that touches upon some public matter? The answer is no. The
public concern standard interests itself with the content and the function
of the speech and whether it serves First Amendment goals. In Snyder,
the Supreme Court was not concerned that "Westboro's speech on pub-
lic matters was in any way contrived to insulate speech on a private
matter from liability." 20 2 It stated that, Westboro has been actively
engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed, and there can be no seri-
ous claim that Westboro's picketing did not represent its honestly
believed views on public issues." 203 The public concern standard will
not allow for a superficial analysis of whether the speaker merely
touches upon a public matter but must determine if the speech serves a
broad public purpose.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court was correct in providing a First Amendment
defense to speech in the area of tort liability. It was also correct in
shielding Westboro Church from liability. Yet, in declining to pro-
nounce a definitive rule in this area of law, an opportunity to strike a
perfect balance between the First Amendment and speech-based torts
has eluded the Court.
The public figure/private figure distinction is arbitrary and insuffi-
200. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218-19 (2011).
201. Id. at 1219 (The Court further noted, "A group of parishioners standing at the very spot
where Westboro stood, holding signs that said "God Bless America" and "God Loves You,"
would not have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort
damages.").
202. Id. at 1217.
203. Id. (The Court also noted, "There was no pre-existing relationship or conflict between
Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboro's speech on public matters was intended to
mask an attack on Snyder over a private matter.").
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cient to preserve the values that the First Amendment and speech-based
torts are designed to protect. It allows for the abridgement of speech in
instances where speakers have the right to engage in the free flow of
ideas or to criticize social or political policies. For instance, do parents
not have the right to criticize the policies of a private school principal?
Should patients be allowed to criticize the conduct of their doctors or
hospital procedures without the fear of being sued? Also, shouldn't pro-
tection be afforded to a mayor or governor if he stands to lose his job or
credibility because he is wrongfully accused of having an affair or a
gambling addiction? The answer to these questions is yes. To remedy
these issues, the public concern standard will protect the dissemination
of all information vital to self-governance or enhancing human enlight-
enment without the needless cost of exposing some to harm. The public
concern standard calibrates the most effective balance of the First
Amendment and speech-based torts.
